Popular Matchings in the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation Problem by Sng, Colin T.S. & Manlove, David F.
  
 
 
 
 
Sng, C. T.S. and Manlove, D. F. (2007) Popular Matchings in the Weighted Capacitated 
House Allocation Problem. In: Algorithms and Complexity in Durham 2007: 
Proceedings of the Third ACiD Workshop, Durham, UK, 17-19 Sep 2007, pp. 129-140. 
ISBN 9781904987550. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/150546/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 25 October 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Popular Matchings in the
Weighted Capacitated House Allocation Problem
Colin T.S. Sng and David F. Manlovey
Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK.
Email: fsngts,davidmg@dcs.gla.ac.uk.
Abstract
We consider the problem of nding a popular matching in the Weighted Capacitated
House Allocation problem (WCHA). An instance of WCHA involves a set of agents
and a set of houses. Each agent has a positive weight indicating his priority, and a
preference list in which a subset of houses are ranked in strict order. Each house has
a capacity that indicates the maximum number of agents who could be matched to
it. A matching M of agents to houses is popular if there is no other matching M 0
such that the total weight of the agents who prefer their allocation in M 0 to that in
M exceeds the total weight of the agents who prefer their allocation in M to that in
M 0. Here, we give an O(
p
Cn1 + m) algorithm to determine if an instance of WCHA
admits a popular matching, and if so, to nd a largest such matching, where C is the
total capacity of the houses, n1 is the number of agents, and m is the total length of
the agents' preference lists.
1 Introduction
An instance I of the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation problem, abbreviated by
WCHA, involves a bipartite graph G = (A;H;E), where A = fa1; a2; :::; an1g is the set
of agents, H = fh1; h2; :::; hn2g is the set of houses and E is the set of edges in G. We
let n = n1 + n2 and m = jEj. Each agent a 2 A ranks in strict order a subset of H (the
acceptable houses for a) represented by his preference list, and E consists of all pairs (a; hj)
such that the house hj appears in the preference list of agent a. We also create a unique
last resort house l(a) for each a and append l(a) to a's preference list. We also henceforth
assume that G contains the vertex l(a) and the edge (a; l(a)) for each a 2 A. Every agent
a has a positive weight w(a) indicating the priority of the agent, and we partition A into
sets P1,P2, ..., Pk, such that the weight of agents in Pz is wz, and w1 > w2 > ::: > wk > 0.
For each agent a 2 A, a has priority z if a 2 Pz, and in such a case we let P (a) = z.
Each house hj 2 H has a capacity cj  1 which indicates the maximum number of agents
that may be assigned to it. We assume that m  max fn1; n2g, i.e. no agent has an
empty preference list and each house is acceptable to at least one agent. We also assume
that cj  n1 for each hj 2 H. Let C =
Pn2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities of the
houses. A matching M in I is a subset of E such that (i) each agent is assigned to at
most one house in M , and (ii) each house hj 2 H is assigned to at most cj agents in
M . We say that a house hj 2 H is full in M if jM(hj)j = cj and undersubscribed in
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M if jM(hj)j < cj . If an agent a 2 A is matched in M , we denote by M(a) the house
that a is matched to in M . We dene M(hj) to be the set of agents matched to hj in
M (thus M(hj) could be empty). Given two matchings M and M
0 in I, we say that an
agent a prefers M 0 to M if either (i) a is matched in M 0 and unmatched in M , or (ii) a
is matched in both M 0 and M and prefers M 0(a) to M(a). Let P (M 0;M) denote the set
of agents who prefer M 0 to M . Then, the satisfaction of M 0 with respect to M is dened
as sat(M 0;M) =
P
a2P (M 0;M) w(a)  
P
a2P (M;M 0) w(a). We say that M
0 is more popular
than M if sat(M 0;M) > 0. Furthermore, a matching M in I is popular if there is no other
matching in I that is more popular than M .
WCHA is an example of a bipartite matching problem with one-sided preferences
[1, 2, 9, 3]. These problems have applications in areas such as campus housing allocation
in US universities [1], hence the problem name; in assigning probationary teachers to their
rst posts in Scotland; and in Amazon's DVD rental service. In many situations where
the total capacity of the houses is fewer than the number of agents or where we would like
to give some agents a better chance of \doing well", the assignment of weights to agents
allow us to build up a spectrum of priority levels for agents in the competition for houses.
For instance, Amazon can give priority to those members of its DVD rental service who
have paid more for privileged status whenever a certain title is limited in stock. A variety
of optimality criteria have been dened for such problems. Gardenfors [8] rst introduced
the notion of a popular matching in the context of voting theory. Alternatively, Pareto
optimality [1, 2] is often regarded by economists as a fundamental property to be satised.
A matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no matching M 0 such that some agent prefers
M 0 to M , and no agent prefers M to M 0. Finally, a matching is rank maximal [9] if it
assigns the maximum number of agents to their rst-choice houses, and subject to this,
the maximum number of agents to their second-choice houses, and so on. However, Pareto
optimal matchings and rank maximal matchings need not be popular.
Popular matchings were considered by Abraham et al. [3] in the context of the House
Allocation problem (HA) { the special case of WCHA where each house has capacity 1
and each agent has the same priority. They gave an instance of HA in which no popular
matching exists and also noted that popular matchings can have dierent sizes. They
described an O(n + m) algorithm for nding a maximum cardinality popular matching
(henceforth a maximum popular matching) if one exists, given an instance of HA. They
also described an O(
p
nm) algorithm for HA when preferences may include ties, i.e. HA
with Ties (HAT).
Several other recent papers have also focused on popular matchings. Chung [6] con-
sidered popular matchings in instances of the Stable Roommate problem (a non-bipartite
generalisation of HA) and noted that a stable matching is popular; however, the same need
not be true in the presence of ties. Mahdian [10] showed that a popular matching exists
with high probability when (i) preference lists are random, and (ii) the number of houses is
a small multiplicative factor larger than the number of agents. Abraham and Kavitha [4]
considered voting paths in relation to popular matchings in a dynamic matching market in
which agents and houses can enter and leave the market. Manlove and Sng [11] studied a
special case of WCHA in which all agents have the same priority { the Capacitated House
Allocation problem (CHA). They gave an O(
p
Cn1 + m) algorithm for nding a (maxi-
mum) popular matching, if one exists, when preferences are strict, and an O((
p
C +n1)m)
algorithm when preferences contain ties. Mestre [12] studied a special case of WCHA in
which all houses have unitary capacity { the Weighted House Allocation problem (WHA).
He gave an O(n + m) algorithm for nding a (maximum) popular matching, if one exists,
when preferences are strict, and an O(min(k
p
n; n)m) algorithm when preferences contain
ties.
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1. for each hj 2 H loop
2. for i in 1::k loop
3. fi;j := 0;
4. for each a 2 P1 loop
5. f(a) := rst-ranked house hj on a's preference list;
6. f1;j ++;
7. for each z in 2::k loop
8. for each a 2 Pz loop
9. q := 1;
10. hj := house at position q on a's preference list;
11. while (
∑z 1
i=1 fi;j  cj) loop
12. q ++;
13. hj := house at position q on a's preference list;
14. f(a) := hj ;
15. fz;j ++;
Figure 1: Algorithm Label-f.
In this paper, we consider popular matchings in an instance I of WCHA (i.e. preference
lists are strict), which is a natural generalisation of the one-one WHA model. We give
a non-trivial extension of the results from [12] to WCHA. We rst develop in Section
2 a characterisation of popular matchings in WCHA. Then, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we
show how to remove certain edges in the underlying graph G which cannot belong to a
popular matching. In Section 3.3, we show how this leads to an O(
p
Cn1 + m) algorithm
for nding a popular matching in I, if one exists. Also, we show in Section 3.3 that any
alternative straightforward approach using \cloning" to solve WCHA instances leads to
slower algorithms than our direct approach. Finally, we show in Section 3.4 how to modify
our algorithm to compute a maximum popular matching if one exists, without altering
the time complexity.
2 Characterising a popular matching
For each agent a 2 A, we introduce the notion of a's f -house and a's s-house denoting
these by f(a) and s(a) respectively. Intuitively, f(a) is the most preferred house hj on a's
preference list to which a could be matched in a popular matching. Therefore, f and s
stand for rst possible and second possible house, respectively. We use Algorithm Label-f
shown in Figure 1 to dene f(a) precisely.
Here, we will dene the f -houses for all the agents in phases, with each phase corre-
sponding to a priority level Pz. Intuitively, during the course of the algorithm's execution,
fi;j will denote the number of agents with priority i whose f -house is dened and equal
to hj . Initially, fi;j = 0 for all i (1  i  k) and j (1  j  n2). We then dene the
f -house for each agent as follows. For every agent a 2 P1, we let f(a) be the rst-ranked
house hj on a's preference list, and we call such a house an f1-house. Given 2  z  k,
for every agent a 2 Pz , we let f(a) be the most-preferred house hj on a's preference list
such that
Pz 1
i=1 fi;j < cj { we call hj an fz-house. Once the algorithm has terminated,
we let fi(hj) denote the set fa 2 Pi : f(a) = hjg. Then, fi;j = jfi(hj)j (possibly fi;j = 0).
It is straightforward to verify that Algorithm Label-f runs in O(m) time if we use virtual
initialisation (described in [5, p.149]) for the steps in lines 1-3. The following example
in Figure 2 gives an illustration of the denition of f -houses. Here, the f -houses of the
agents are as follows: f(a1) = h1, f(a2) = h3, f(a3) = h3, f(a4) = h4, f(a5) = h4 and
f(a6) = h4.
Now, for each hj 2 H, let f(hj) = fa 2 A : f(a) = hjg and fj = jf(hj)j (possibly
3
Agent Priority Weight Pref list House Capacity
a1: 1 7 h1 h2 h3 h1 1
a2: 2 4 h1 h3 h4 h2 2
a3: 2 4 h3 h5 h3 2
a4: 3 2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h4 2
a5: 3 2 h1 h4 h5 h5 1
a6: 3 2 h4 h1 h2
Figure 2: Example WCHA instance.
fj = 0), i.e. f(hj) =
Sk
p=1 fp(hj). Clearly each hj may be an fz-house for more than one
priority level z. For every such hj , let us dene dj to denote the priority level such that
dj =

max fr : 0  r  k ^ fr;j 6= 0g ; if fj  cj;
max fr : 0  r  k ^Pri=1 fi;j  cjg ; if fj > cj:
Note that for every hj such that fj > cj , clearly
Sk
p=dj+1
fp(hj) 6= ;. Hence, for every such
hj , we dene gj to be the priority level such that gj = max fr : dj < r  k ^ fr;j 6= 0g. We
refer to Figure 2 for illustration. Here, d1 = 1, d3 = 2 and d4 = 2. Note that d2 and d5 are
not dened, for h2 and h5 are not f -houses for any agent. Also, since f4 > c4, it follows
that g4 = 3; however, h4 is the only f -house hj such that fj > cj .
The following lemmas are vital rst steps in characterising popular matchings in
WCHA (due to space limitations, see [13] for the proofs of all lemmas and theorems).
Lemma 1. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I. Then, for each
hj 2 H,
Sdj
i=1 fi(hj)  M(hj).
Lemma 2. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I. Then, for each
hj 2 H, if fj > cj, then M(hj)n
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj)  fgj (hj).
We now dene the concept of an s-house for each agent. If M(a) 6= f(a), then as we
shall show, M(a) = s(a). Given 1  z  k, for every agent a 2 Pz, we dene s(a) to be
the most preferred house hj on a's preference list such that hj 6= f(a) and
Pz
i=1 fi;j < cj .
To illustrate s-houses, let us look at the example in Figure 2 again. We may verify from
the denition of s-houses that s(a1) = h2, s(a2) = h4, s(a3) = h5, s(a4) = h5, s(a5) = h5
and s(a6) = h2. Clearly, the set of fi-houses need not be disjoint from the set of sj-houses
for i 6= j. Now, since the process of dening s-houses is analogous to the algorithm for
dening f -houses, the time complexity for dening s-houses is also O(m). Note that s(a)
may not exist if f(a) = l(a). However, all such agents will be matched to their f -houses
in any matching since last resort houses are unique to individual agents. Now, it may be
shown that a popular matching M will only match an agent a to either f(a) or s(a) as
indicated by the next lemma.
Lemma 3. Let M be a popular matching in any WCHA instance I. Then, every agent
a 2 A is matched in M to either f(a) or s(a).
Lemmas 1-3 give rise to the following result.
Theorem 4. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I.
1. For every f -house hj,
(a) if fj  cj, then f(hj)  M(hj);
(b) if fj > cj, then jM(hj)j = cj,
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj)  M(hj), and
M(hj)n
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj)  fgj (hj).
2. Every agent a is matched to either f(a) or s(a).
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3 Algorithm for nding a popular matching
Let us form a subgraph G0 of G by letting G0 contain only two edges for each agent
a 2 A, that is, one to f(a) and the other to s(a). It follows that all popular match-
ings must be contained in G0 by Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 4. However, Theorem 4
only gives us necessary conditions for a matching to be popular in an instance of WCHA,
since not all matchings in G0 satisfying these conditions are popular. For let us consider
the example WCHA instance in Figure 2. We have two matchings which satisfy Condi-
tions 1 and 2 of Theorem 4: M1 = f(a1; h1); (a2; h3); (a3; h3); (a4; h5); (a5; h4); (a6; h4)g
and M2 = f(a1; h1); (a2; h3); (a3; h3); (a4; h4); (a5; h5); (a6; h4)g. However, while M1 is
a popular matching, M2 is not popular because there exists another matching M3 =
f(a2; h1); (a3; h3); (a4; h3); (a5; h4); (a6; h4)g which gives an improvement in satisfaction of
w(a2) + w(a4) + w(a5)   w(a1) = 4 + 2 + 2   7 > 0 over M2. Hence, we will \enforce"
the suciency of the conditions by removing certain edges in G0 that cannot form part of
any popular matching in I. We show how to do this by rst introducing the notion of a
potential improvement path or PIP in short, which generalises the concept of a promotion
path from [12] to WCHA.
3.1 Potential improvement paths
Let us now dene a matching M that satises Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 4 to be
well-formed. Then, a PIP leading out of some f -house hi0 with respect to M is an
alternating path  = hhi0 ; ai0 ; hi1 ; ai1 ; :::; hix ; aixi such that hij = f(aij ) and (aij ; hij ) 2 M
for 0  j  x, and aij strictly prefers hij+1 to hij for j < x. A PIP leading out of hi0
always exists, which can be seen as follows. Since hi0 is an f -house and ci0  1, there
exists some agent ai0 2 f(hi0) \ M(hi0) by Theorem 4. Then, by denition, hhi0 ; ai0i is
a PIP leading out of hi0 . The next lemma shows that any PIP leading out of hi0 must
contain a sequence of agents with strictly decreasing priorities. Hence, the sequence of
agents in  must be distinct since the priority of agents is strictly decreasing.
Lemma 5. Let M be a well-formed matching. Let  = hhi0 ; ai0 ; :::; hix ; aixi be a potential
improvement path with respect to M leading out of hi0 as dened above. Then, P (aij+1) <
P (aij ) for 0  j < x.
Let us dene the cost of  to be cost() = w(aix)   w(aix 1)   :::   w(ai0). Note that
cost() = w(ai0) if x = 0. We now motivate the notion of a PIP as follows. Let us suppose
that there exists some agent ar who prefers hi0 to M(ar). The next lemma shows that
any such agent cannot belong to . Now, if cost() < w(ar), we can conclude that the
well-formed matching M is not popular because we can promote ar to hj , and use the
PIP to promote each aij to hij+1 for all j < x and demote aix to l(aix) to obtain a new
matching that is more popular than M .
Lemma 6. Let M be a well-formed matching. Let  = hhi0 ; ai0 ; :::; hix ; aixi be a potential
improvement path with respect to M leading out of hi0 as dened above. Then, any agent
a who prefers hi0 to M(a) does not belong to .
3.2 Pruning the graph
Let us now introduce Algorithm Prune-WCHA, as given in Figure 3, which will enable us
to remove certain edges in G0 that cannot be part of any popular matching. The algorithm
is divided into two stages, and the rst stage is carried out in phases, with each phase
corresponding to a priority level Pz. Intuitively, in each phase in the rst stage, we compute
the costs of PIPs and determine the minimum of these for each f -house hj , and then use
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these values to identify and remove certain edges incident to f -houses in G 0 that cannot
belong to any popular matching. Based on the minimum values of PIPs calculated for
f -houses in the rst stage, we then identify and remove in the second stage edges incident
to s-houses in G0 that cannot belong to any popular matching. Let G00 denote the graph
obtained from G0 once the algorithm terminates (following these pruning operations). The
removal of these edges will ensure that any well-formed matching in G00 is popular. Over
the phases of execution, certain conditions may arise which signal to the algorithm that
no popular matching exists.
Recall that hj may be an f -house for more than one priority level, and hj may be
an f -house for more than one agent for each priority level. In the algorithm, we will
use z(hj) to compute the minimum cost of a PIP leading out of hj taken over all well-
formed matchings in G00 such that (ar; hj) is the rst edge for some ar 2 Pz. We will
also use (hj) to compute the minimum cost taken over all z(hj). Let min(hj) denote
a PIP with minimum cost leading out of hj taken over all well-formed matchings in G
00.
Let cost(min(hj)) denote the cost of this path. Then, the nal value of (hj) in the
execution of the algorithm gives us the value of cost(min(hj)). For any agent as 2 A,
let S contain the set of houses on as's preference list that as prefers to f(as). If S 6= ;,
we will use min(as; f(as)) within the algorithm to compute the minimum cost of a PIP
out of hq taken over all hq 2 S, and over all well-formed matchings in G00; otherwise,
min(as; f(as)) = 1. Similarly, let R contain the set of houses on as's preference list after
f(as) that as prefers to s(as). If R 6= ;, we will use min(as; s(as)) within the algorithm
to compute the minimum cost of a PIP out of hq taken over all hq 2 R, and over all
well-formed matchings in G00; otherwise, min(as; s(as)) = 1.
The next three lemmas are vital results which establish the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 7. Any edge removed by Algorithm Prune-WCHA cannot belong to a popular
matching.
Lemma 8. If Algorithm Prune-WCHA reports that no popular matching exists, then there
does not exist any well-formed matching in G0 that is popular.
Lemma 9. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not state that no popular matching
exists. Let M be a well-formed matching in the pruned graph G00. Then, M is popular.
We now use the example in Figure 2 to illustrate our algorithm. After the rst stage,
we have (h1) = 7, (h3) = 3 and (h4) = 2. We remove the edges (a1; h2) in phase 1, and
(a2; h4) and (a3; h5) in phase 2 of the rst stage (in line 17) since a1 belongs to fd1(h1),
and a2 and a3 belong to fd3(h3) respectively. We also remove the edge (a4; h4) in phase
3 of the rst stage (in lines 20-21) since min(a4; h4) = 3 < 2w(a4). No further edges are
removed in the second stage.
3.3 Finding a popular matching
We are now left with the task of nding a well-formed matching M in G00 in order to nd
a popular matching if one exists. Note that the removal of edges from G0 by Algorithm
Prune-WCHA eectively reduces the problem to that of nding a popular matching in an
instance of CHA. For let us consider the problem of trying to match each f -house hj so that
hj satises the conditions of a well-formed matching. Now, if fj  cj , then ensuring thatSdj
p=1 fp(hj)  M(hj) is equivalent to ensuring Condition 1(a) of Theorem 1 of [11]. On
the other hand, if fj > cj , we need to ensure that those agents with the correct priorities
are matched to hj in M , i.e. there does not exist any agent a 2
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj)nM(hj). Now,
since line 17 in the rst stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA ensures the removal of the edge
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1. for each f -house h loop
2. (h) := w1; /* a suitable upper bound */
3. - - - - - rst stage - - - - - - -
4. for z in 1::k loop
5. for each a 2 Pz loop
6. S := fh 2 H : a prefers h to f(a)g;
7. if S 6= ; then
8. min(a; f(a)) := min f(h) : h 2 Sg;
9. else
10. min(a; f(a)) := 1; /* a suitable default value */
11. if min(a; f(a)) < wz then
12. return \No popular matching exists";
13. for each fz-house hj loop
14. f 0z(hj) := fz(hj);
15. if z  dj
16. for each a 2 f 0z(hj)
17. remove (a; s(a)) from G0;
18. else (// z > dj )
19. for each a 2 f 0z(hj) such that min(a; hj) < 2wz loop
20. remove (a; hj) from G
0;
21. remove a from f 0z(hj);
22. if f 0z(hj) = ; then
23. return \No popular matching exists.";
24. z(hj) := min(wz ; min fmin(a; hj)  wz : a 2 f 0z(hj)g);
25. (hj) := min((hj); z(hj));
26. if z = gj and (hj) < wz then
27. return \No popular matching exists.";
28. - - - - - - second stage - - - - - - - -
29. for each a 2 A loop
30. hl := s(a);
31. R := fh 2 H : a prefers h to hlg n(S [ ff(a)g);
32. if R 6= ; then
33. min(a; hl) := min f(h) : h 2 Rg;
34. else
35. min(a; hl) := 1;/* a suitable default value */
36. if min(a; hl) < w(a) or fl  cl then
37. remove (a; hl) from G
0;
Figure 3: Algorithm Prune-WCHA for removing edges from G0
(a; s(a)) of every such a where a 2 Sdjp=1 fp(hj), a must be matched to f(a) if an agent-
complete matching (i.e. a matching in which all agents are matched) is to exist. This
is equivalent to the work done by lines 10-18 of Algorithm Popular-CHA of [11], which
tries to nd an agent-complete matching and reports that no popular matching exists if
unsuccessful. Lastly, we need to ensure that each agent is matched to either f(a) or s(a)
and it is evident that Algorithm Popular-CHA also does this. Hence, we can nd a popular
matching in WCHA, if one exists, by running Algorithm Popular-CHA on the pruned
graph G00. As illustration, if we run Algorithm Popular-CHA on the example in Figure 2
after edge removals through Algorithm Prune-WCHA, then Algorithm Popular-CHA will
return the following matching M = f(a1; h1); (a2; h3); (a3; h3); (a4; h5); (a5; h4); (a6; h4)g
which may be veried to be popular.
Let us now consider the time taken to nd a popular matching in an instance of WCHA,
or to report that no such matching exists. First of all, it takes O(m) time to dene the
f - and s-houses. Algorithm Prune-WCHA may be veried to run in O(m) time overall
(see [13]). Now, it takes O(
p
Cn1 + m) time, using Algorithm Popular-CHA, to nd a
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well-formed matching (if one exists) in G00, where C is the total capacity of the houses.
This gives us the following.
Theorem 10. Let I be an instance of WCHA. Then, we can nd a popular matching in
I, or determine that none exists, in O(
p
Cn1 + m) time.
\Cloning" versus our direct approach
A straightforward solution to nding a popular matching, given an instance I of WCHA,
may be to use \cloning" to create an instance J of WHA where preference lists are allowed
to contain ties, and then to apply the O(min(k
p
n; n)m) algorithm of [12] to J . Firstly,
we create cj clones h
1
j ; h
2
j ; :::; h
cj
j of each house hj in I, where each clone has a capacity of
1. In addition, we replace each occurrence of hj in a given agent's preference list with the
sequence h1j ; h
2
j ; :::; h
cj
j , the elements of which are listed in a single tie at the point where
hj appears. Let GJ denote the underlying graph of J . Then, GJ contains n
0 = n1 + C
nodes. For each ai 2 A, let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses for ai, and let cmin =
min fcj : hj 2 Hg. Then the number of edges in GJ is m0 =
P
ai2A
P
hj2Ai
cj  mcmin.
Hence, the complexity of applying the algorithm of [12] to J is 
(min(k
p
n1 + C; n1 +
C)mcmin). Now, the complexity of our algorithm may be rewritten as O(
p
Cn1) or O(m)
depending on which component dominates the running time. If n1 +C  k
p
n1 + C, then
the cloning approach takes 
(k
p
n1 + Cmcmin)) time which is slower than our algorithm
by a factor of 
(kcmin). Otherwise, if n1+C < k
p
n1 + C, then the cloning approach takes

(mcmin(n1 + C)) time which is slower than our algorithm by a factor of 
(
p
Ccmin). It
follows that the cloning method is slower than our direct approach for all possible cases.
3.4 Finding a maximum popular matching
It remains to consider the problem of nding a maximum popular matching in WCHA.
Let us run Algorithm Label-f and Algorithm Prune-WCHA as before to dene f - and
s-houses and to delete certain edges which cannot belong to any popular matching. We
then adopt a similar algorithm to that in [11] as follows. That is, let A1 be the set of
all agents a with s(a) = l(a), and let A2 = AnA1. Our objective is to nd a well-formed
matching in G00 which minimises the number of A1-agents who are matched to their last
resort house. We let A0 denote the set
n
a 2 Sdjp=1 fp(hj)
o
. We begin by carrying out a
pre-processing step on G00 to compute a matching M0 that matches each agent in A
0 to his
f -house. We then try to nd a maximum matching M 0 in G00 that only involves the A2nA0
agents that remain unmatched after pre-processing and their incident edges. If M 0 is not
an agent-complete matching of A2nA0 agents that remain unmatched after pre-processing,
then clearly I admits no popular matching. Otherwise, we remove all edges in G 00 that are
incident to a last resort house, and try to match additional A1-agents to their f -houses
by repeatedly nding an augmenting path with respect to M 0 using Gabow's algorithm
[7] in a similar approach to that for CHA [11]. Let M 00 be the matching obtained by
augmenting M 0. If any A1-agent remains unmatched at the end of this step, we simply
assign him to his last resort house, to obtain an agent-complete matching of AnA 0 agents
in G00. Let M = M0[M 00. If any agent a belonging to AnA0 is not matched to his f -house
hj but hj is undersubscribed in M , we promote a from M(a) to hj . Then, clearly M will
be a well-formed matching in G00, and hence popular by Lemma 9. It follows that M is a
maximum popular matching, giving the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Given an instance of WCHA, we can nd a maximum popular matching,
or determine that none exists, in O(
p
Cn1 + m) time.
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